factor to help others (Eisenberg & Miller 1987) . Davis (1983) , however, argues that different dimensions of empathy will have a different effect on the social behavior. For example, perspective taking, is likely to have a positive contribution due, in part, to inciting nonegocentric behaviors; whereas personal distress, characterized by anxiety from seeing another person in distress, will have an opposite effect due to preoccupation with one's own feelings (Davis 1983) .
While there is a large body of literature demonstrating an existing link between empathy and prosocial behavior (e.g., Tangney 1991), surprisingly, very few studies (only three known to the authors) have examined the direct link between empathy and moral reasoning. One comes from a study of 149 Brazilian adolescents, by Eisenberg, Zhou, and Koller (2001) , and that the study found that perspective taking, was positively predictive of prosocial moral reasoning. Another study was conducted by Skoe (2010) and found that individuals with higher perspective taking showed higher level of carebased moral reasoning. In the same study, personal distress was positively associated with chronic fearfulness and emotional vulnerability which, one can speculate, may cause preoccupation with one's self and feeling of shame, and lead to risky, socially undesirable behavior (e.g., Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek 2007) . Finally, Berenguer (2007; demonstrated experimentally that inducing participants to feel more empathy led to a helping behavior (i.e., money donation to an environmental program) and to more moral arguments about environmental dilemmas.
Given the theory and empirical evidence, the prediction of the present study was that moral competence would be positively correlated with perspective taking and negatively correlated with personal distress.
The link between moral competence and affective state
Long before psychology was a field, famed philosophers Immanuel Kant and David Hume speculated about the driving force behind morality. Kantian ideology held that dispassionate reason drove the moral decision-making process. He stood firm that a moral decision was founded solely upon the utilitarian mindset and therefore was uninfluenced by affective factors (Kant 1785). Thus, according to his view, moral competence should not be affected by the affective state of the person making a moral decision. Alternatively, Hume held that passions drove moral judgments. He argued that people are susceptible to being influenced and deceived, or "clouded", by an array of factors including one's emotions (Hume 1751). This debate is far from being resolved. Psychologist David Pizarro (2000) , for example, argues that affective arousal is a necessary condition for people to recognize an act as immoral and to begin moral deliberation. Similarly, Frijda (1988) argues that emotions are "lawful phenomena"; they are aroused for things we care about and are absent when we don't care about something. Pizarro (2000) refers to emotions as an "energy source" that forces individuals to make a moral judgment; but he agrees with those who believe that affective arousal is the most effective at promoting moral Thus, the literature is still inadequate in terms of explaining the link between various positive and negative affective states and moral reasoning. Thus, the present study hypothesized that the negative and positive affective states would be related to moral competence, however no hypotheses were made as to the nature of these associations.
Methods

Sample
Students who were enrolled in an online University of Florida undergraduate online course were recruited to participate. The sample size was selected based on the feasibility of collecting the data within one academic summer semester. Out of 68 enrolled in the class students, 51 agreed to participate, which represents 75% of the class population. A power calculation demonstrated that the current sample size produced a statistical power of 90%. In the sample, there were 41 females and 10 males. The participants were between age 18 and 40, with an average age of 23. The sample was 58% Caucasian, 22% Latin-
American, and 20% other ethnicities. To avoid any perception of coercion, the primary investigator did not partake in collecting data from individuals who chose to participate.
Those who did not wish to participate were offered an alternative opportunity to earn the extra credit point. All of the surveys were anonymous and administered by Qualtrics.
Instruments
The study consisted of two waves of surveys. The first wave, containing the 
1988), and Moral Competence Test instrument (MCT; Lind 2014) (This instrument
measures moral competence and moral orientation by presenting moral dilemmas and asking participants to rate their level of being in agreement with several arguments for and against certain decisions), was sent out at the end of the semester. The demographic data collected includes the participants' sex, ethnicity, and age.
Results
Means for the major variables are presented in Table 1 . In these analyses, all significant tests are two-tailed unless otherwise stated.
Descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses
Paired samples T-tests were computed to examine if empathy and affective states changed over time (see Table 1 ). The test revealed that only personal distress was significantly different between the two assessments. Descriptive statistics show that moral competence scores ranged between .33 to 43.49, with a mean of 11.3 and standard deviation of 10.1. When interpreting these numbers, the higher the score is, the higher the moral competence exhibited is. These results are comparable to other contemporary studies (see Liaquat 2013; Lee 2010). Thus, all empathy scores, except for personal distress, and both affective states were averaged to be used in subsequent analyses. Next, bivariate correlations were computed to examine the associations between empathy, affective states, age, sex and moral competence. The results revealed that only fantasy, perspective taking, and negative affective state were significantly (positively) correlated with moral competence (see Table 2 ). In addition, bivariate correlations revealed a significant positive association between perspective taking and positive affect; while positive affect negatively associated with personal distress (at both time 1 and time 2); and negative affect was positively correlated with empathic concern and with personal distress (at time 1). 
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Multiple regression analyses
A stepwise multiple regression was conducted to find the best combination 
Discussion
The present study was set to examine the relative contributions of affective states and empathy to moral competence.
As predicted, perspective taking was positively correlated with moral competence.
Furthermore, it was the strongest and the only significant empathy-related predictor.
Negative affect was the second and also a positive predictor of moral competence, thus, supporting the mood and cognition theory by Schwartz and Bless (2001) which asserts that people in a negative mood are more attentive to details; since staying consistent in one's moral judgment requires focused attention, feeling more negative can help to stay focused and avoid heuristics.
Unlike predicted, personal distress was not associated with moral competence, however, there are several possible explanations for that. First, self-reports may not always be reliable as they may be confounded with the desire to appear in more socially desirable ways (e.g., Archer, Diaz-Loving, Gollwitzer, Davis, & Foushee 1981) . Second, all past known studies have studied the link between personal distress and prosocial behavior (e.g., motivation to help); while moral competence should be related to prosocial behavior, it is a different act all together. It is possible that while personal distress may reduce the likelihood of acting prosocially, its effect on moral reasoning may be quite different. Finally, the reason why individuals who become more personally distressed over a misfortune of a victim are less likely to act prosocially is to escape the unpleasantness of being in distress; thus, one can assume that the cause of the distress must be related to the motivation (or lack thereof) to act prosocially, including judging on a moral dilemma.
In the present study, personal distress was potentially unrelated to the moral dilemmas given to the participants; the timing when the subjects took the survey the second time coincided with their final exams, thus, potentially explaining the inconsistency in personal distress scores.
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that morally competent individuals are those who can better understand other's mental states rather than those who can emotionally empathize. Furthermore, the findings of this study suggest that emotions do not always impede moral judgment; at least in the case of negative affect, they can help direct people to the details of the situation at hand which can in turn improve their moral reasoning. Future studies will have to further differentiate between different types of negative emotions and their relationship with moral competence and reasoning. For example, it is not clear whether sadness behaves consistently with disgust. Finally, given prior literature and the findings of the present study, perspective taking emerges as an important element in both, moral reasoning and prosocial behavior; and as such should be examined more in depth in developmental research. This is especially true when seeking to explain individual differences in moral behavior (e.g., bullying, moral disengagement, etc.).
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